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Background &    
Motivation
Crash Causes and Modeling
• The safety profession has focused on 
crashes and how to model them for decades. 
• A well accepted definition of safety, provided 
by Ezra Hauer (1997), from a SYSTEMS 
PERSPECTIVE, is:
“Safety is the number of crashes, or crash 
consequences, by kind and severity, 
expected to occur on the entity during a 
specified period”
Causes 
of 
Crashes 
in US
Crashes 
occur in 
clusters
on segments 
and at 
intersections

• Does our current models of crashes at 
system locations capture sufficient 
complexity?
• Are there elements of the data 
generating process that we are failing to 
capture?
• How can we gain greater insight into 
motor vehicle crashes and their 
causes?
Research Motivation
• How safe can a road segment or 
intersection become?
• What fraction of crashes will be 
eliminated by engineering vs. behavioral 
investments? 
• Which locations are hamstrung by 
behavioral problems, by 
traffic/geometric problems?
Research Motivation (cntd.)
Current “accepted” 
state of the practice
The prevailing view:
Crashes are the result of 
a single underlying 
process, i.e., a function 
of 1 set of measured 
factors (1 equation).
Unmeasured factors 
result in unobserved 
variation that is 
typically modelled as 
extra-Poisson 
variation. 
Generally, crashes are modeled with 
a Poisson-gamma regression:
λi = EXP(βXi + εi)
Where,
λi is the expected crash count at site i and is 
approximately Poisson distributed with 
gamma heterogeneity of Poisson means
β is a vector of estimated parameters
Xi is a vector of site attributes thought to 
influence crashes
εi is unobserved heterogeneity of site i
Crashes
Traffic Volume
Simple example:
Suppose we record the number of intersection 
crashes at 165 intersections. 
At the sites we might measure:
• Major road average daily traffic
• Minor road average daily traffic
• Width and type of the median
• Width of the shoulder
• Presence of horizontal curve
• Number of driveways near the intersection
The crash data across sites:
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Crashes
Limitations of this approach:
• Crashes are assumed to be 
generated by a singular, underlying 
process
• There is no explicit recognition of 
possible distinct components of 
crash counts 
• This model yields limited (or 
incorrect) insight into how best to 
invest in safety improvements
Consider a 
somewhat more 
complex data 
generating process
Suppose crashes result from:
1. Observed geometric and 
traffic operations 
influences
2. Unobserved spatial 
influences
3. Random influences
What these may look like….
Traffic and 
Geometric
Unobserved 
Spatial
Random
Observed geometric & traffic 
operations influences
Much research has established that measureable 
geometric and operational features influence 
observed frequency of crashes. 
Intersections: traffic volume, turning movements, 
phasing, channelization, median treatments, 
presence of crosswalks, bus pullouts, driveways, 
etc. 
Segments: traffic volume, speeds, shoulder width 
and treatment, lane widths, driveways, roadway 
surface, roadside cross slopes, roadside 
hazards, etc.
Unobserved spatial effects
This underlying process accounts for a non-trivial 
proportion of crashes. Many spatial factors known 
to affect safety are not typically measured or 
observed. 
Examples include roads near drinking 
establishments, local pavement conditions, local 
distractions (billboards, glare, signs, etc.), proximity 
to a university (pedestrian and bicycle traffic), 
proximity to animal populations, micro-climates, 
etc.
Spatial effects tend to influence safety at specific 
locations, and thus traffic volume and location are 
needed to estimate these effects. 
Random influences
Most “random” effects are the result of human 
factors issues that are unobserved or 
unknown at the time of a crash. Examples 
include in-vehicle distractions (cell phone, 
changing radio, eating food, day-dreaming, 
fatigue, talking with passenger, etc.) and rare 
random events such as striking debris in the 
road, mechanical breakdowns, etc. 
From a ‘system’ perspective these events are 
largely unpredictable and related only to 
traffic volume.
Crashes are the sum of 3 latent
(unobserved) distributions that sum to a 
Poisson or NB (what we observe).
The 3 distributions are grounded in 
existing knowledge/theory of crash 
causation. 
This theory is a substantial departure from 
current thinking, where crashes are 
modelled to arise from a single 
underlying data generating process.  
Thus……
What does this new model of 
crashes look like?
Why is this revised model important? 
1. The 3 components, if known, may imply 
different strategies for improving safety
2. The contributions of the random and spatial 
effects only serve to ‘muddy’ the waters 
from a systems engineering perspective
3. We can gain a better sense of what sites 
are ‘correctable’, and what measures are 
needed
Is such a model with 3 latent 
mixture distributions estimable?
• Yes, but it is not easy (many 
unknowns)
• It requires the exploitation of 
exogenous information
• I demonstrate here using a Bayesian 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling 
estimation technique
The model specification, in words:
• The sum of three counts at each site is 
negative binomial distributed
• At any particular site the contribution 
from any/all distributions could be zero
• No constraints are imposed on the 
shape of individual latent distributions
• Each latent distribution model is 
specified separately 
The new model: theory
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Where do the thetas come from?
Method 1: A random sample of crashes is 
drawn and estimates are obtained as to what 
are the correct thetas.
Method 2: Past research guides us: About 60% 
of crashes are the result of human factors 
issues, etc.
Method 3: The subject of further research…… 
(For this demonstration I use Random 0.60, 
Unobserved Spatial 0.20, Observed 0.20)
Why Bayes’ and MCMC
• Bayes’ Theorem is simply a gateway to 
MCMC in practice (although most 
academics do not freely admit this)
• Markov Chain Monte Carlo is simply a way 
to randomly sample from distributions with 
specific properties (think random number 
generator in Excel)
• Using Bayes’ and MCMC, the distributions 
are conditional, and when informative 
priors are used, are distribution mixtures
Classical NB Model of Total Counts
 node  mean  sd  MC 
error 
2.5% median 97.5% start sample 
Beta 0 1.624 0.05232 0.001244 1.522 1.624 1.727 30001 10000 
ADTMAJ 0.3905 0.05934 0.001522 0.2768 0.3902 0.5081 30001 10000 
ADTMIN 0.8818 0.08802 0.003253 0.7124 0.8811 1.058 30001 10000 
ADTCROSS -0.9657 0.06078 0.002369 -1.083 -0.9645 -0.8475 30001 10000 
MEDWDTH -0.3791 0.05663 0.001267 -0.497 -0.3764 -0.2743 30001 10000 
HORIZCRV 0.1504 0.05011 9.006E-4 0.05205 0.1499 0.2482 30001 10000 
    GOF     
mae 2.469 0.09878 0.001271 2.279 2.469 2.668 30001 10000 
mdev 0.07104 0.1752 0.002167 -0.2742 0.07261 0.4093 30001 10000 
mse 13.54 1.597 0.01757 10.69 13.46 16.9 30001 10000 
mae = mean absolute error; mdev = mean deviation; mse = mean squared error 
Latent Distribution Model I
Effect  mean  sd 2.5% median 97.5% 
   RANDOM EFFECTS  
Beta 0 -3.27 0.3899 -4.057 -3.231 -2.592 
ADTMAJ + ADTMIN 1.659 0.113 1.42 1.659 1.882 
  ENG.    & TRAFFIC EFFECTS  
Beta 0 -0.399 0.1652 -0.7686 -0.3867 -0.1015 
ADTMAJ* ADTMIN -2.201 0.3144 -2.871 -2.201 -1.594 
SHLDWDTH 0.48 0.07848 0.3277 0.478 0.6338 
DRIVWAY -0.4908 0.1512 -0.7938 -0.4823 -0.2062 
   SPATIAL EFFECTS  
Beta 0 1.056 0.02442 1.004 1.057 1.102 
ADTMAJ + ADTMIN 0.1742 0.02479 0.1248 0.1757 0.2228 
Gamma[i] 1.00 0.224    
   GOF   
mae 2.785 0.00331 2.656 2.783 2.921 
mdev 0.00312 0.00303 -0.1734 0.00302 0.1771 
mse 14.5 0.8472 13.1 14.4 16.43 
mae = mean absolute error; mdev = mean deviation; mse = mean squared error 
node  mean  sd  MC 
error 
2.5% median 97.5% start sample 
    RANDOM EFFECTS    
Beta 0 0.8841 0.04943 0.003241 0.7777 0.8857 0.9762 50001 10000 
ADTMAJ 0.375 0.08532 0.006319 0.2086 0.3768 0.5388 50001 10000 
ADTMIN 0.6089 0.05337 0.003311 0.5053 0.6103 0.7088 50001 10000 
ADTCROSS -0.1804 0.02938 0.001874 -0.238 -0.1806 -0.1241 50001 10000 
    OBSERVED EFFECTS    
Beta 0 -1.312 0.4294 0.0397 -2.276 -1.264 -0.5924 50001 10000 
ADTMAJ 1.059 0.2243 0.01924 0.6473 1.051 1.552 50001 10000 
ADTMIN -0.7148 0.2959 0.01919 -1.419 -0.675 -0.2768 50001 10000 
SHLDWDTH 0.572 0.1309 0.01083 0.308 0.5748 0.8357 50001 10000 
DRIVWAY -1.193 0.2971 0.02536 -1.785 -1.197 -0.6225 50001 10000 
    UNOBSERVED EFFECTS    
ADTMAJ -6.354 1.117 0.09697 -8.693 -6.2 -4.494 50001 10000 
Gamma[i] 0.00 0.224       
    GOF     
mae 2.777 0.09223 0.002894 2.597 2.776 2.962 50001 40000 
mdev -0.1074 0.08805 0.001111 -0.2797 -0.1073 0.06528 50001 40000 
mse 16.36 1.428 0.03527 13.73 16.29 19.35 50001 40000 
mae = mean absolute error; mdev = mean deviation; mse = mean squared error 
Latent Distribution Model II
Recall this figure….
Practical Implications
How are sites identified as 
‘high risk’ using this 
methodology?
Top 20 
High Risk 
Sites 
identified 
by model
(bold is 
unique site)
Total Crashes Observed Traffic & Geometric Unobserved Spatial
117 49 117
122 134 148
121 118 146
130 1 138
138 11 129
143 88 83
156 130 164
11 86 125
146 16 153
153 5 130
86 140 162
120 28 122
71 90 121
155 93 123
49 144 116
62 143 120
8 36 156
28 115 161
88 50 155
39 32 86
How much can safety be improved?
Sites improve when countermeasures are 
installed, but how much is possible?
Presumably one could use the components to 
estimate the performance of sites in the 
absence of traffic and geometric effects (or 
behavioral effects, spatial effects, etc.)
How should countermeasures be 
allocated at specific sites?
The components may reveal which types of 
countermeasures are appropriate across 
sites
Conclusions and 
remaining 
work
1. It is feasible to estimate, 
econometrically, the three mixture 
components of the model. 
2. Upon validation and testing, this model 
may reveal insights that have 
heretofore been unavailable to safety 
engineers/practitioners
3. This model is meant to question and 
improve upon the basic understanding 
and modeling of crashes
Conclusions
1. The validation of this model requires 
careful thought/experimentation
2. The model specification needs 
improvement; could new variables help 
predict which sites suffer from spatial 
effects? or behavioral factors? 
3. How can the proportions (thetas) be 
reliably obtained?
4. Endogeneity remains to be addressed, 
as does overlapping ‘causes’
Remaining work
